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Foreign Fighters
Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the
Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’
CERWYN MOORE
Department of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
This article examines foreign fighters and the insurgency in the North Caucasus.
The first part of the article addresses conceptual issues concerning the ways that
foreign fighters are analysed, posing this more widely in terms of transnational acti-
vism. Here I examine the importance of kin and relatedness. I develop this argument
in the second part of the article, which examines pan-Islamism and transnational
activism in the post-Soviet period. The third section draws attention to the different
groups of foreign fighters, as part of a wider activist movement in the North
Caucasus. Here I show that a complex group of transnational activists from the
Greater Middle East, North Africa, parts of Europe, and Central Asia participated
in the conflicts in the North Caucasus. Finally, the article turns to examine
volunteers from the North Caucasus who travelled to fight in Syria, concluding with
some considerations about the reintegration of returnees and former activists.
Keywords foreign fighter, insurgency, kinship, North Caucasus, social move-
ments, transnational activism
Introduction
In late March 2012, the Russian authorities announced the capture of an important
member of the Ansar mujahedeen in a counter-terror operation in the North
Caucasus.1 Less than a month later, rebel groups confirmed that Abu Khalid, a
long-serving member of the Ansar mujahedeen in Southern Russia, had become one
of the few foreign volunteers captured alive.2 Reportedly of Libyan origin and in
his late forties, he was a veteran of the regional insurgency who, at the time of his cap-
ture, had been serving as a Qadi or judge in the hierarchy of the Imarat Kavkaz (IK).
Another member of the Ansar mujahedeen in the North Caucasus, known by the nom
de guerre Abdullah al-Turki, made a series of video statements in support of the
regional jihad before his death in May 2011. He was reportedly a Turkish citizen in
his mid-thirties. As a veteran fighter, Abdullah had assumed the mantle of Emir of
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the Ansar mujahedeen on the death of Muhannad. The videos, interspersed with
photos and Arabic prayers, included an appeal to Muslims from Turkey to support
the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The two examples illustrate not only that trans-
national activists in the North Caucasus came from a range of very different back-
grounds but also that volunteering to participate in foreign insurgencies is a
multifaceted phenomenon—with many activists playing a range of roles.
The analysis which follows seeks to shed light on the character of transnational
activism—and foreign fighters—in the North Caucasus, and latterly in Syria, providing
detailed empirical analysis of the different groups of volunteers, and of the roles played
by different transnational activists, using a case study approach and drawing on a data-
set created by the author.3 Equally, the article offers a contribution to the conceptua-
lisation of transnational activism by highlighting some anomalies in the use of the term
‘‘foreign fighter,’’ who may be neither (exclusively) fighters nor indeed ‘‘foreign,’’
except in the narrow sense of nationality and citizenship. Here the article draws on
the ideas of ‘‘fictive kinship’’ and ‘‘relatedness.’’ Finally, this article also offers support
to the thesis that ‘‘foreign fighters’’ are not tied to specific branches of Islamic dis-
course. The analysis here builds on work by the author and others analysing the con-
flict dynamics which have framed militancy and activism in the North Caucasus.4
Analysing Activism: Foreign Fighters and Fictive Kin
The overwhelming body of work on foreign fighters and contemporary activist move-
ments has focused on recruitment or mobilisation and occasionally the converse, disen-
gagement from militant movements more generally.5 The impact of foreign fighters on
local conflict dynamics has drawn some attention.6 Yet, apart from some works in
social movement theory that did address broader issues related to transnationalism,7
conceptual issues have received relatively little attention.8 A more refined analytical
and scholarly body of work on ‘‘foreign fighters’’ has emerged in recent years. However,
despite the fact that the term foreign fighter is now widely used outside the academic
community, such commentaries make little reference to the richness of scholarly debate.
What is of interest here is the contested definitional parameters of foreign
fighters that can be traced across three phases of academic work. Consideration of
the different frames of reference and forms of activism informed much of the first
cluster of literature. A 2005 in-depth study of the growth of Al Qaeda looked at
the mobilisation of ‘‘transnationalist jihadis.’’9 Others writing for ‘‘think tanks’’ also
began to assess the enduring influence of the ‘‘Afghan Arabs’’ and ‘‘foreign
fighters.’’10 Academic analysis in this phase of work focused on ‘‘non-indigenous,
non-territorialized combatants,’’ highlighting that volunteers were neither local
nor from the indigenous communities neighbouring a conflict zone, while also exam-
ining how activists undertake transnational travel to participate in hostilities, if they
are to be considered ‘‘foreign fighters.’’11 The effect of this case study approach and
definition was also to draw attention to those who were not primarily, or not only,
combatants, a point raised in a second piece on foreign fighters by the same
authors.12 This definition and approach would thus point towards locating analysis
of foreign fighters within the wider body of work on transnational activism.
Around the same time, a slightly different definition of foreign fighters was
offered in the comparative work of David Malet, another of the first cluster of
academics. For Malet, foreign fighters are ‘‘noncitizens of conflict states who join
insurgencies during civil conflict.’’13 This provides a useful definition which goes
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some way to set general parameters, using citizenship to inform case selection and
identify which data can be used in large-N comparative analysis. Yet, interestingly,
Malet himself notes that the label ‘‘transnational insurgent’’ is more ‘‘meaningfully
descriptive,’’ although the term ‘‘foreign fighter’’ is now more commonly used.14
This serves to illustrate the ubiquity of the term ‘‘foreign fighter,’’ while also high-
lighting nuances and differences between early definitions.
Equally important was a second cluster of work which explored conceptual
issues, mobilisation, and the impact of foreign fighters on conflict.15 Partly prompted
by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the aim was to enrich analysis using large-N
comparative studies of ‘‘foreign fighters.’’16 Thomas Hegghammer, who was at the
forefront of the second batch of work, sought to establish foreign fighters as a dis-
tinctive category of ‘‘actor.’’ He also highlighted that foreign fighters in Afghanistan,
and in the post-Soviet period, represent a ‘‘violent offshoot of a qualitatively new
subcurrent of Islamism—popular pan-Islamism.’’17 Illustrating how foreign fighters
sit within broader social movements, this argument echoed themes raised in the first
cluster of work. At the same time, however, for Hegghammer, building on Malet’s
earlier definition, foreign fighters have four characteristics: they lack affiliation to
an official military; they are unpaid; they do not share the citizenship of factions
involved in conflicts, nor do they have kin or diaspora connections to fighting
groups.18 Taking a comparative perspective on mobilisation, his work differed from
other case study approaches which examine the ‘‘life-cycle’’ and impact of foreign
fighters.19
A third cluster of work, mixing and building on the two earlier phases, has
emerged in recent years and includes scholarly research as well as reports by think
tanks and journalists focusing on the country of origin of foreign fighters engaged
in contemporary conflicts, notably Iraq and Syria.20 One branch of this evolving
body of work has largely focused on conventional comparative studies, sometimes
drawing on social media accounts of activists and basic biographies of volunteer
combatants.
By no means exhaustive, this account does highlight key works and key themes
shaping the contours of contemporary research into foreign fighters. There are
clearly many overlaps between these three clusters of work, particularly where
researchers seek to identify historical=comparative patterns and in modifications
of the label or category itself. One aspect that remains somewhat neglected, however,
is the role of foreign volunteers, a point touched upon in passing in earlier work by
this author, and revisited in the following section of this article.21 This stems from an
overarching assumption that volunteerism leads directly to combat, whereas many
participants may initially play a role as activists.
Another largely neglected feature of the debates about foreign fighters is the role
of kin. Hegghammer even explicitly rules out kin or diaspora connections to fighting
groups from his definition of foreign fighters. By contrast, Cerwyn Moore and Paul
Tumelty, in the first cluster of academic work on foreign fighters, drew attention
to the way in which ‘‘religion, kinship, and=or ideology’’ led to mobilization.22 This
aspect may be fruitfully explored by reference to the way that contemporary anthro-
pological work has challenged the modern, Western notion of kinship through
elaborating the concept of ‘‘fictive kin.’’ This account of ‘‘fictive kin’’ speaks of relat-
edness in terms of different bases of a shared sense of solidarity—connectedness,
bonds—which are adaptive and which change over time.23 Commonly understood
as differentiated from traditional ‘‘blood’’ ties, blood and fictive kin may now be
Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’ 3
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seen as more of a continuum. Importantly, fictive kin does not mean fictional.
Rather, it draws attention to the ways in which kinship ties are made or formed. This
sheds light on the ways in which ‘‘relatedness,’’ instead of blood ties alone, informs
kin. The case study of ‘‘foreign’’ fighters offered here indicates different ways in
which ‘‘bonding’’ and a sense of ‘‘relatedness’’ played an important role in activism,
informing the decision to travel to conflict zones.
Kinship linked to the Jordanian-Chechen Diaspora in the Middle East and the
Kazakh-based Chechen community in Central Asia shaped activism. However, a
more general sense of ‘‘relatedness’’ shaped the decision by many from communities
in Turkey to travel and participate in combat in the North Caucasus in support of
imagined brethren. Obviously geographical proximity and extant networks provided
important channels facilitating the movement of volunteers from Turkey. But the
wider community in the region held sympathy for peoples of North Caucasian
origin. In more recent years, a sense of pan-Turkic activism also informed the
decision by some to participate in combat in the North Caucasus, fusing the regional
insurgency with a larger militant movement spanning parts of Europe, Russia, and
Central Asia. Hence too an indirect sense of relatedness was infused with a
pan-Islamic sentiment that itself evoked a kin imaginary made active in shared com-
bat, and activism and volunteerism more generally. Over time, it is the merger
between ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘fictive’’ kin that produces new forms of relatedness which have
salience.24 In this way a rejection of blood, biological, and classical bonds to family,
ethnicity, or nation creates space for new forms of connectedness to emerge.25 Many
foreign fighters explicitly reject nationality and ethnicity, affiliating instead with
‘‘fictive kin.’’ Engaging in activism offers a measure of authenticity as new forms
of kinship emerge, which are then reinforced over time. According to Janet Carsten,
this reading of kinship is susceptible ‘‘to continuous transformations and adapta-
tions’’ which resonate politically and symbolically.26
It could be argued that foreign fighters are perceived as ‘‘foreign’’ by those they
are fighting against. In many cases, volunteer combatants are also perceived as
foreign by those they are fighting alongside. However, many may view themselves
in a different way, invoking a sense of ‘‘relatedness’’ or kin connection to local fight-
ing groups, which evolves over time. This is most obvious with diaspora communities
but also in the more general frames of reference used by activists. Although a portion
of those who travelled to the North Caucasus had ‘‘kinship’’ ties, at least in part,
others travelled as a result of a shared sense of community, fighting in support of
the Umma. Mobilisation was informed by a shared sense of identity, ‘‘fictive
kinship,’’ through pan-Islamist discourse which in many ways calls into question
the notion of ‘‘foreign,’’ as implied by nationality or citizenship.27 Locating foreign
fighters as transnational activists and placing them in a wider body of work on social
movement theory, opens up this vein of analysis of relatedness.28 That many volun-
teers do not view themselves as ‘‘foreign’’ is due, at least in part, to themes raised by
Abdallah Azzam in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s and other post-Soviet conflicts.
Afghanistan and Azzam: The Emergence of Pan-Islamic Transnational
Activism
In the early 1980s, a newfound sense of Islamic identification emerged in parts of the
Middle East. It is significant that this growing religious sensibility occurred against
the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan. It is true that when the Soviet Red Army
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invaded Afghanistan in 1979, galvanising local resistance to foreign occupation, the
war did not initially lead to widespread mobilisation of volunteers from the Middle
East. Yet, it did spark a surge of interest in Islamic activism. At the forefront of this
ideological shift in Islamic activist discourse was the ‘‘Imam of Jihad,’’ Abdallah
Azzam. Azzam would become the ‘‘most important individual behind the mobilis-
ation of Arab volunteers for Afghanistan,’’29 establishing a sense of solidarity among
activists as part of a wider Muslim community.30 Although only one among a num-
ber of theological figures advancing a reading of jihad as an individual obligation,
it was Azzam’s vision—fusing a doctrinal rationale with an organisational
infrastructure—that inspired and enabled foreign fighters to travel to Afghanistan
in the latter part of the 1980s.31 A pan-Islamic discourse and the series of ‘‘guest
houses’’ in Pakistan became a template for Islamic foreign fighters.32 (Ironically,
in a way, this mirrored the approach taken by the Comintern to support Left-Wing
groups in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.)
In the late 1980s, a pamphlet by Abdallah Azzam told the life of a martyr from
Jordan. Celebrated as a warrior in the epitaph, the volunteer’s Chechen ancestral
background was noted: he had family connections to those who had taken up arms
against Russia in the 19th century under the leadership of Imam Shamil, a Sufi
leader of the Murid movement.33 Another Jordanian-Chechen, who would later
assume the name Shaykh Fathi al-Shishani, also became integrated into the ranks
of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Although not a fighter, due to health problems,
Shaykh Fathi’s links to foreign support networks provided support for the mujahed-
een group led by Abu Sayyaf. Many of the ‘‘Afghan Arabs,’’ as they would later
become known, travelled to ‘‘defend a Muslim community, which in their opinion
was occupied by an infidel, atheist power.’’34 The powerful symbolic role played
by figures from Islamic history, including figures from the North Caucasus, con-
tinues to influence activist networks, notably in Syria.
Azzam celebrated a notion of broad and inclusive form of pan-Islamic
activism—and a view of ‘‘jihad’’ which was ‘‘congruent with the prescriptions of
the Shari’a—that became influential in mobilising further support.35 In producing
a sense of solidarity, re-imaging activism as part of a wider Muslim community,
Azzam tied activism, at least in part, to a metaphorical sense of ‘‘fictive kin.’’ This
may be seen in his address to the Umma at large and more specifically in the brother-
hood of shared activism, and his martyr pamphlets.36 Importantly, as Hegghammer
notes, the reading of pan-Islamism advanced by Azzam was but one version of broad
discourse of Islamic activism, while his own experience and individual role as an
ideological figurehead was also important.37 Nonetheless, Azzam’s legacy framed
the activism of a group of Jordanian-Chechen and Saudi volunteers who had visited
Afghanistan in the late 1980s, but who then went on to use the template to mobilise
foreign fighters in other conflict zones.38
From Afghanistan to the North Caucasus
Following the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan, and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, many of the Saudi volunteers travelled elsewhere as activists to
support what they viewed as embattled Muslim communities.39 Three Ansar muja-
hedeen groups had fought an anti-Russian jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s,
with Ibn Khattab leading one of them. In the early part of the 1990s, they supported
the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a coalition of Islamist groups, opposed to the
Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’ 5
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Russian-based Tajik authorities. A small, close group of veteran fighters, led by Ibn
Khattab, were invited to Dagestan in 1995. The ‘‘embattled communities’’ in the
North Caucasus were based not just in Chechnya, but also in Dagestan and other
parts of the region.
Building on his experience in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Khattab recognised
the importance of ensuring local support for external groups such as the Ansar
Mujahedeen.40 Even in times of crisis, in order for jihad to be legitimate and feasible,
the local community must first invite foreign volunteers for assistance, as he
emphasised on his initial arrival in Dagestan in 1995 at the invitation of the
Jordanian-Chechen and veteran of Afghanistan, Shaykh Fathi.41
Abstaining from participation in local politics, Khattab presented one aspect of
his activism as a version of da’wa, or the preaching of Islam as part of a community
effort to support Islam.42 He thus located his actions within an important theme of
Saudi activism, following an authentic ‘‘Prophetic tradition.’’43 Khattab reiterated
the importance of undertaking action, in keeping with the creed of contemporary
jihadi discourse, and the need for inclusive Muslim solidarity.44 Although only a
small group of local Chechen and Dagestani groups directed attacks against Sufi
norms, frequently supported by some foreign ideologues, Khattab avoided confron-
tation with Sufis. His vision of jihad echoed the pan-Islamic activism advocated by
Abdallah Azzam, and this provided the ideological architecture for the Ansar Arab
mujahedeen in the North Caucasus.45
At this time a local version of Islamic activism, shaped by aspects of Salafiyya
thought, was emerging in the North Caucasus. Local ideologues in Dagestan and
Chechnya advanced a ‘‘purist’’ reading of Islam, which fed into anti-federal mili-
tancy in the region. Although differences existed between local theologians and
religious leaders,46 a patronage network, donations and charitable grants, enabled
this group of Islamists to fuse local purist and external pan-Islamist agendas, giving
the Shari’a Guard, and the local militia and foreign volunteers linked to Khattab’s
jama’at (al-Jama’at al ul-Islamiyya), as well as local parties such as Islamskaya
Natsiya (Islamic Nation), a measure of independence and financial and ideological
influence.47
During this period, Dagestani, Chechen, and Afghan Arab ideologues gave ser-
mons and disseminated their ideas through pamphlets, advancing their vision of
jihad as a pan-Islamist struggle.48 According to the Chechen Islamist Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev, the North Caucasus was occupied Muslim land: hence jihad was
articulated in terms of a regional pan-Islamism which aimed to unify Chechnya
and Dagestan and lead to the establishment of Islamic Caliphate.49 Members of
the Umma were obliged to undertake action to ‘‘protect Muslim peoples and land,
in defence of the principles and conditions of Islam and faith in Allah.’’50 The
Islamist rhetoric drew together a wide range of young volunteers from ethnic and
sub-ethnic groups (Dargin, Lak), facilitating the formation of a regional political
and military movement.51 In April 1998, Movladi Udugov, Shamil Basaev, and
supporters such as Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev convened a Congress of Peoples of
Dagestan and Ichkeria, with the aim of unifying the mountain peoples.52 In the inter-
war years, this local puritanical agenda had fused regional groups with the external
networks linked to Ibn Khattab.53 Whereas the Dagestani groups in the Kadar zone
and the Jordanian-Chechens promoted the Shari’a Courts and Shari’a Law as a way
to govern, Khattab’s pan-Islamist agenda focused on supporting embattled and
beleaguered Islamic communities as part of a wider revivalist movement. Different
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doctrinal and ethnically orientated threads ran through these communities, with
Islam providing a unifying or bridging narrative.54
There is no doubt that a pan-Islamist account of jihad—informed by the work of
Abdallah Azzam—played a role in the conflicts in the North Caucasus, and provided
an important motivation for some foreign fighters, including the Arab mujahedeen.
It is important to note, however, that pre-existing narratives of Salafiyya Islam—or
what was labelled locally as ‘‘pure Islam’’—existed in the North Caucasus, as did a
vision of pan-Caucasian regional armed resistance, which co-existed with nationalist
and secular motives for activism. Deep-rooted kin affiliations linked members of the
Middle Eastern Chechen Diaspora communities with local Islamist communities,
while fictive kin also acted as a bridgehead, melding pan-Islamist and local
anti-Russian groups. In these ways, different accounts of activism co-existed during
the period from the first largely nationalist war (1994–1996) through the course of
the inter-war period and second war from 1999, until the Russian authorities
declared an end to the conflict in 2009.
However, during this period the narrative frames used to support the insurgency
also adapted. Although the conflict focused on Chechnya, it was also regional and
anti-federal for many affiliates of the Chechen-led groups. In the period from
2002–2006, the North Caucasus witnessed a surge in low-level violence, linked to
what had become a regional insurgency. Then, in 2007, insurgent leaders, notably
the Kabardin leader Anzor Astemirov, laid the framework for the formalisation
of the Imarat Kavkaz (IK). Looking now at the IK, one finds embedded within it
a multiplicity of different factions, each with different aims, experience and expertise,
agendas and capabilities. Its overarching appeal to Islam as a binding force has led
many commentators to link the IK directly with other jihadist organisations, but this
neglects its local and regional character. The IK is a loosely connected set of local
jama’ats which, together, form a regional network. The IK acts as a hub, in and
of itself, directing attacks against the federal authorities in Russia while providing
a regional platform for the various local jama’ats. One element of the insurgency
has been the IK’s capacity to morph and change so as draw in new generations of
aspiring militants from a host of backgrounds, using non-relational, relational,
and brokerage pathways as part of the scale-shift to a regional social movement.55
Another, often obscured, aspect of the IK is the appeal of pan-Islamist sentiments,
including the work of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in sustaining a regional
network.56
Foreign Activism and the Insurgency in the North Caucasus
During the first 15 months of the second conflict (1999–2009), the Arab mujahedeen
website reported the deaths of dozens of volunteers. Considerable numbers
were killed in the defence of Grozny and the subsequent withdrawal from the
encircled city. The dead included Turkish volunteers as well as a handful of
Jordanian-Chechens, and a number of others from Kuwait, Yemen, and Gulf State
Emirates. The ‘‘martyr epitaphs’’ referred to volunteers from the Arabian peninsula
and Arabia, situating the activism of the Khattab group within a broader
pan-Islamic movement and the Prophetic sentiments of Arab activists. According
to Madawi al-Rasheed, militant Saudi activism was ‘‘dependent on the notion of
an Islamic umma, encompassing different races, nationalities and cultural groups.’’57
This Saudi community viewed the Arabian peninsula, with its ‘‘perceived common
Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’ 7
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political and cultural heritage,’’ as the vanguard of an ‘‘imagined community’’ that
existed between the ‘‘modern nation state and the larger international community
such as the umma.’’58 In effect then, these Arabian volunteers viewed themselves
as part of an imagined community, as fictive kin within the umma. The adoption
of specific noms de guerre—identifying tribal, town, or Islamic heritage rather than
their nationality or ethnicity—illustrates the attempt to construct a form of related-
ness associated with fictive kin.59 Similar sentiments are expressed through the
names used by Turkish and North African volunteers and activists who participated
in the conflicts in the North Caucasus, again emphasising an attempt to produce
‘‘fictive kinship.’’
Many refugees from the Chechen conflict had sought refuge in the Pankisi
Gorge just across the border in Georgia; its encampment of Internally Displaced
Peoples (IDPs) provided cover for clandestine networks supporting the boyeviki
and enabling the movement of munitions and manpower. By late 1999, a small group
of Arab volunteers, including Saudi and Jordanian representatives of charitable
organisations, had arrived in the Gorge. Members of this group such as the young
Khaled Yusuf Mohammad (who would later become known under the nom de guerre
Muhannad), acted as preachers, seeking to proselytise and support the work of
charitable organisations in their endeavours to build new mosques in the region.
The much larger IDP encampments in Ingushetia also served as recruitment
grounds, or places for shelter, for boyeviki who had left the front lines in Chechnya.
Meanwhile, an inner circle of younger volunteers and a slightly older group of
Arab fighters and members of the Chechen Diaspora community remained in the
region, supporting the Arab Mujahedeen. Abu Hafs al-Urdani, who had ties to
Khattab, was a key member of the Ansar mujahedeen, having arrived in the region
in 1995.60 He enjoyed support as a volunteer fighter, given the kinship ties between
the Chechen Diaspora community in Jordan and their North Caucasian brethren.
Indeed Jordanian-Chechens played an important role in the foreign fighter move-
ment in the region, following their spiritual figurehead, Shaykh Fathi ali-Shishani.61
A loose grouping made up of Abu Omar al-Sayf, the Saudi spiritual aide to Ibn
Khattab, Abu Walid al-Ghamidi, Khattab’s newly anointed deputy, Abu Hafs
al-Urdani, and Abu Qutybah continued to lead the Arab mujahedeen under the
overall command of Amir Ibn Khattab. Other groups of foreign fighters included
Turkish volunteers, at the time led by commander Bilal, who retained a measure
of independence, and members of the Chechen Diaspora community. These foreign
volunteers were based across the Caucasus, often offering support through
clandestine networks.
Each of the leaders of the foreign fighters was surrounded by a coterie of close
aides and religious advisors. For example, Khattab was supported by his first
deputy, the Egyptian Abu Bakr Aqeedah, until his death in Buinaksk, Dagestan,
in December 1997. Although the movement headed by Khattab was multi-ethnic,
a number of his inner circle including his second deputy, Hakim al-Medani, were
Saudi. It was not their shared nationality or ethnicity, as such, that was important
but, rather, the fact that many had travelled and fought with him in Tajikistan
during 1993–94. While appealing to a broad sense of Islamic solidarity, the recruit-
ment of Saudi activists for the fighting in North Caucasus was explicitly ‘‘grounded
in real [past] experiences, networks, friendships, and family and kin circles.’’62
Reports indicate that similar local networks were important in the recruitment
and activism of others from Kuwait, Yemen, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, with the
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latter two groups drawing extensively on connections in the diaspora communities to
facilitate mobilisation.63
The Saudi Abu Omar al-Sayf acted as a religious advisor both to Khattab and
his successor, Abu Walid al-Ghamidi. By the time of Abu Walid’s tenure many key
members of Khattab’s Arab mujahedeen had been killed, although a handful of
veterans including the Saudi, Abu Qutaybah, remained in the region. Following
the death of Abu Walid in April 2004, Abu Omar al-Sayf attempted to assert more
theological control over the movement, especially given the changing geopolitical
scene following 9=11 and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.64 However
it was Abu Qutaybah, a logistics expert, who appears to have acted as interim leader
of the foreign mujahedeen, playing a prominent role in the movement until Abu Hafs
al-Urdani took direct leadership of the Ansar fighters.65 Qutaybah was killed in July
2004, and Abu Omar al-Sayf in 2005, essentially ending the involvement of the
Khattab network in the region. The death of the ‘‘movement entrepreneurs’’
(ideologues; financiers; recruiters; trainers; military leaders) curtailed the incentive
for activism, and by late 2005 the geo-political moment had shifted to Iraq.
Despite the dwindling influence of foreign fighters during 2005, a small group of
volunteers continued to operate in the region under the command of Abu Hafs
al-Urdani. By this stage, the movement had become more regional in character with
a handful of foreign fighters, including Muhannad, supported by the Jordanian Abu
Yasir, and Abdullah al-Turki, becoming integrated into the Chechen-led jama’ats in
Vedeno. During 2005 and 2006 many of the local veteran leaders were also killed by
the federal authorities, curtailing the actions of insurgency. Thereafter, the move-
ment increasingly took on a more regional anti-federal hue.
Turning to the roles played by ‘‘foreign fighters,’’ current research suggests that
the label covers activists who assumed medical, financial, theological, and technical
roles supporting the movements. For many, their role as combatants was secondary.
Others who were more directly involved in military operations also held roles as
trainers, weapons and logistical experts, and leaders, rather than being exclusively
combatants. This illustrates not only conceptual anomalies of the category ‘‘foreign
fighter,’’ but also that the motivation for activism may vary greatly, even where
volunteers are involved in conflicts as combatants. Although the biographical
Table 1. Leadership of foreign fighters in the North Caucasus
Nom
de guerre Nationality
Prior military
experience
Primary area
of operations Tenure
Ibn Khattab Saudi Yes Chechnya
and Dagestan
Feb 95 –
May 02
Abu Walid
al-Ghamidi
Saudi Yes Chechnya May 02 –
April 04
Abu Hafs
al-Urdani
Jordanian No Chechnya
and Dagestan
April 04 –
Dec 06
Muhannad Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Chechnya Dec 06 –
April 2011
Abdullah
al-Turki
Turkish Unconfirmed Chechnya
and Dagestan
April 2011 –
May 2011
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material is incomplete, it highlights the importance of prior military experience, the
functional role of language in some activist movements, and the ways in which
foreign fighters portray themselves, shedding light on ‘‘particular forms of
diffusion.’’67
I have studied biographical information from open source material, collating
general details regarding the role of foreign fighters in the North Caucasus so as
to produce a dataset. Martyr biographies, trial proceedings and official statements,
human rights reports, as well as newspaper and newswire reports, amongst other
sources, were used to triangulate data.68 The dataset which I have compiled draws
on biographical material from 164 activists who have participated in conflicts in
the North Caucasus from 1992 through to 2013. A considerable portion of material
concerns individuals who have been killed, although it also includes a small num-
ber of activists and foreign volunteers who admitted involvement in hostilities in
the North Caucasus, and who have since been arrested and imprisoned. The data-
set contains details about Middle Eastern volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Yemen, Jordan, and other parts of the region as well as biographical information
regarding a number of North African volunteers from Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and
Morocco. Another batch of information covers Turkish foreign fighters and there
is further material on a small number of other activists from Europe. It is impor-
tant to acknowledge, however, that the dataset is far from a complete overview of
foreign fighters or transnational activism. It lacks information on large groups of
volunteers from the region, notably from Azerbaijan, and outside the region,
including volunteers from Central Asia. Despite movement between different
groups, I largely avoid the inclusion of data about foreign fighters who were not
directly aligned to the International Islamic Peacekeeping Battalion (IIPB), Ibn
Khattab, the Basayev network, or the Imarat Kavkaz.69 For all its omissions,
the findings are useful nonetheless.
The data certainly illustrate that transnational activism is a much more com-
plex phenomenon than the term ‘‘foreign fighter’’ indicates.70 A small group of
Saudi volunteers led the foreign fighter movement, with Jordanian and Turkish
volunteers also playing important, but slightly different roles. Both Shamil Basaev
and Khattab sought to regulate the flow of foreign fighters, recognising how an
influx of unskilled volunteers could undermine the movement.71 The Saudi volun-
teers worked alongside multi-ethnic foreign fighters from the Middle East (Jordan,
Kuwait, and Yemen), Turkey, North Africa (Algeria and Egypt), and Europe. The
Table 2. Foreign fighters in the North Caucasus, 1995–2012
Region of
origin Number
Prior military
experience
Primary role
(Fighter)
Primary role
(Financier; linguist;
ideologue; trainer;
military leader)
Middle East 66 15 35 23
Turkey 50 366 24 5
North Africa 23 Unknown 11 4
Europe 20 Unknown Unknown 2
Unknown 5 Unknown 5 0
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data indicates that ‘‘prior military experience’’ in the form either of training within
an army, be it professionally or as a conscript, or actual fighting as a volunteer in
another conflict is crucial when considering ‘‘capability’’ and leadership. Two
former fighters and close aides of Khattab—Khalid al-Subayt and Salih
al-Awfi—returned to Saudi Arabia after the end of the first war.72 They helped
to raise funds and support the training facility at Serzhen-Yurt, during the
inter-war years. In this way former combatants, some whom might have been
injured, often assumed roles as ‘‘trainers,’’ ‘‘recruiters,’’ and logistical aides. The
dataset highlights that foreign volunteers participated in a transnational social
movement which was multi-ethnic, regionally based, and included many activists
from a similar generation. More generally, the data also serves to illustrate that
qualitative case study research on ‘‘foreign fighters,’’ even when informed by parti-
cular methods such as Social Network Analysis (SNA), can be enhanced by draw-
ing on transnational activism and social movement theory. In particular it draws
attention to the ‘‘active’’ processes involved in movements, on ‘‘dynamic mechan-
isms and processes of contention like framing, coalition forming, diffusion, and
brokerage’’ as well as ‘‘scale shift.’’73
The data also indicates that many foreign fighters had different roles in what
was a transnational activist movement. This is not uncommon, especially when
comparing activism in the North Caucasus with other case studies.74 In the case
of the NC, many activists held dual roles. Some were fighters for the most part,
while this was a secondary role for others. Some were primarily trainers, weapons
experts, or military planners. Others provided ideological=theological, financial,
media, or medical advice, while serving as combatants in a secondary role. Some
were IT specialists and had technical expertise; others held roles as linguists and
translators. Some held positions as leaders, commanding small militia groups as
part of a broader activist movement. Importantly then, activist movements include
different factions, sometimes based on ethnicity and kinship ties, with language
often playing a functional role. In the North Caucasus, command of Arabic gave
some activists, notably religious advisors, a measure of authority and influence
within the foreign fighter movement. This meant that certain groups—namely
the Jordanian-Chechens—had significant roles, bridging local and external acti-
vism and giving them some influence in Chechen culture. Others—such as the
Turkish volunteers—while incorporated into units led by the Arab mujahedeen
and Ruslan Gelayev, amongst others, also retained a degree of operational inde-
pendence, due to their prior military experience and familiarity with their North
Caucasian brethren. Some had independence, or assumed leadership roles, due
to long service in the conflicts, with a handful arriving prior to Khattab in 1995.
Local recruits included hundreds of Dagestanis and Chechens, with dozens of
others from the likes of the Nogai community visiting the training facility at
Serzhen-Yurt. Dozens of Central Asian and Arab volunteers also passed through
the training programme during 1998 and the early part of 1999. Many of the Arab
fighters had arrived in the inter-war years, sometimes marrying into the highland
communities in Chechnya and Dagestan. While this lent them some local support,
assistance from the outside world waned. By late 2000, the cause of the Arab
mujahedeen in Chechnya was seen as folly by many donors and supporters from
the Middle East. Hundreds of foreign volunteers had been killed in federal opera-
tions during the course of the conflict, both in 1999 in Dagestan and in Chechnya
thereafter. Many were Turks and Jordanian Chechens, some of whom shared loose
Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’ 11
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 03
:22
 26
 M
ay
 20
15
 
kinship ties with the boyeviki, although dozens of other Saudi and, to a lesser degree,
Kuwaiti, as well as North African and European volunteers, had been killed in
clashes. Many surviving jihadi fighters left the North Caucasus.
Following the end of large-scale hostilities during 2002, foreign fighters contin-
ued to play important roles as financiers, logistical experts, and in some cases leaders
involved in combat operations. However their numbers dwindled, especially after the
death of key veterans during 2004–2006. The remaining foreign volunteers were
largely from a younger generation of activists, and although they held key roles in
the hierarchy of the insurgency, none had the profile of the earlier Arab fighters.
Turkish volunteers continued to play a role, while those that remained were inte-
grated into the infrastructure of the Imarat Kavkaz, after its inception in October
2007. Throughout 2009–2012, they were active in internal ideological disputes, which
essentially splintered the Chechen-led character of the regional insurgency. By 2012,
the role of foreign fighters had tapered off to such a degree, that no recognisable
leader of the foreign volunteers now exists.
Around the same time, pressure from the federal authorities in Chechnya and
Ingushetia forced many fighters to seek refuge beyond the borders of Russia, as
normalisation and amnesties weakened the regional insurgency. Meanwhile, the
death and capture of veteran leaders and key people in the hierarchy of the move-
ment, including Amir Astemirov, Supyan Abdullayev, Amir Magas and a number
of Dagestani leaders, further weakened the IK. In Chechnya, the death of the
Gakayev brothers and the destruction of their group, along with the death of the
foreign fighters affiliated to the Vedeno jama’ats, temporarily weakened the capacity
of the militant movement in the highlands. Then, in the months building up to the
Sochi Winter Olympics it became clear that the insurgency had suffered another
major setback. After the Games, militant groups announced that the veteran
Chechen leader, Doku Umarov, had been killed in September 2013. The former Qadi
and Dagestani religious advisor, Aliashkab Kebekov, eventually assumed the role of
leader of the IK, as Umarov’s successor.
By this time in early 2014, the number of foreign fighters in the North Caucasus
had considerably diminished. Other jihadi theatres were easier to get to and offered
more opportunities for young volunteers from the Middle East, Central Asia, North
Africa, and Europe. These had long existed in Iraq and, by 2013, Syria was opening
up. The presence of Chechen foreign fighters in other conflicts has long been a
matter of speculation, while Chechnya itself, and its veterans, occupied an important
position in jihadi culture. Although based on limited and often anecdotal evidence,
the presence of North Caucasian volunteers in other jihadi theatres such as
Afghanistan had become widely accepted in popular studies of militancy. The
conflict in Syria would re-ignite this debate, given the involvement of many North
Caucasian volunteers.
Activism Beyond the North Caucasus
The conflict in Syria has received considerable coverage of ‘‘foreign fighters,’’
who often maintain an online presence through social media. While reports
understandably focus on the role of European, and more specifically British, foreign
fighters in Syria, the conflict has also seen participation by significant numbers of
activists from North Africa, the Middle East, and, to a lesser degree, from the former
Soviet Union. Among these Russian-speaking transnational activists and foreign
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fighters, news reports indicate that a number of different factions, including those
from the North Caucasus, have played a role in the conflict.
The label ‘‘al-Shishani,’’ the Arabic term for ‘‘Chechen,’’ is often adopted by
fighters from the region. A badge of honour, with the conflict in Chechnya viewed
as one of the most challenging theatres in jihadi culture, it also acts as a convenient
shorthand and label of origin which many volunteers from the Caucasus use, thus
avoiding the need to explain ethnic and sub-ethnic categories. By the same token,
the label al-Shishani masks a complex picture involving different factions of
Russian-speaking foreign fighters, many of whom have not travelled directly from
Chechnya or who are not actually Chechen. This is not to deny that dozens of
Chechens have fought in Syria over the course of conflict. Rather, it indicates the
multi-ethnic nature of this component of the foreign fighter movement in Syria.
Indeed, fighters from the Caucasus cannot be properly understood without some
grasp of the conflicts in the North Caucasus.
The most well known members of the Chechen community currently fighting in
Syria travelled there from the Pankisi Gorge. Some were relatively young and
inexperienced volunteers; a small handful had more direct ties to Chechen boyeviki
and bandformirovaniya formations. Duisi, once a hub for the Chechen mujahedeen
during the second Russo-Chechen war (1999–2009), is one of a number of villages
of the Kist peoples, a sub-ethnic Chechen community numbering less than 15,000.
They speak a dialect of the Nakh language, which is shared with others from
Chechnya and Ingushetia. Pankisi is a place of refuge for these different communities
and a transit point for people moving between the North and South Caucasus.
Others from the Caucasus, including dozens of Azeris, Kabardin, Balkar, and
Dagestani volunteers, have made their way to Syria. Once there, they linked up with
local groups fighting against Assad.
Following the subjugation of the North Caucasus by Russian forces in 1860,
over a hundred thousand peoples were deported or emigrated to Turkey. This group
became part of a wider generation of North Caucasian Diaspora who settled in parts
of Turkey, in Jordan and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq over the following fifty years. In
Syria itself, there were already some Chechen communities in Latakia. Indeed, long-
standing links between groups from the North Caucasus and Syria between 2000 and
2005 are illustrated by the fact that Aliashkab Kebekov, the newly appointed head of
the IK, reportedly received religious instruction from local groups in Damascus.
Other North Caucasian communities existed in Damascus and in towns on the bor-
der between Turkey and Syria. There is also a small Chechen community in Deir
ez-Zor, in the eastern part of Syria.
Chechen communities can also been found across the former Soviet Union,
notably in parts of Kazakhstan, having been forcibly deported under Stalin in the
1940s. Small itinerant communities, essentially part of a second group of emigrants,
can also be found across the former Soviet Union. The two conflicts of the 1990s also
created a more recent, third diaspora community, that includes tens of thousands of
Chechens residing in Austria and Poland, as well as other small communities in
Central and Northern Europe.75 A small section of this diaspora has chosen to fight
in Syria, and given a recent spate of arrests, it also appears that Germany and
Austria, as well as Bosnia, have been important transit points for members of the
Chechen Diaspora en route to Syria.76
There are a number of different, but linked, reasons why Russian-speaking
activists appeared in Syria and managed to quickly form combat jama’ats (groups)
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or assume leadership roles in factions involved in the conflict. First, a number of
veterans were based nearby, in Turkey. Following a series of assassinations in
Turkey targeting associates of the IK, some were particularly anxious to leave. Press-
ure on other Chechen communities in the Middle East, notably in Egypt, may also
have encouraged volunteers from the diaspora community to travel to Syria. Sec-
ondly, Chechen sources indicate that an influential group of Chechen advisors and
financiers—with longstanding ties to the insurgency and links in Turkey—played
an important role organising some Russian-speaking foreign fighter groups in Syria.
This group, including Isa Umarov, had links to the Middle East and also had con-
nections to groups in Syria, enabling the recruitment and mobilisation of volunteers.
They provided a logistical channel and financial support through which volunteers
could travel into Syria. However, it also appears that during the first years of the
Syrian Civil War many volunteers from the Caucasus, Russia, and the Chechen
Diaspora community acted independently, travelling in small groups using their
own contacts.77 Thirdly, the extensive North Caucasian community in Azerbaijan
and Turkey, as well as the Jordanian-Chechen community, played a role in mobilis-
ing activists. These connections remain important, particularly in familiarising
activists from the North Caucasus with other ideological frames of activism.
It is also worth mentioning the ‘‘Lopota Incident’’ in late August 2012, which
may have driven activists to Syria. With armed attacks in Dagestan increasing
during 2012 as local jama’ats intensified their activities, the tension with the Russian
authorities, still running high in the wake of the 2008 war over Ossetia, were
exacerbated. On August 30, reports emerged that a gunfight had occurred in the
Lopota Gorge, a remote region of Georgia bordering Dagestan, in which a number
of local Kist men, as well as at least three members of the Georgian armed forces,
Table 3. Leaders of Chechen or Russian-speaking jama’ats in Syria
Nom
de guerre Ethnicity Jama’at
Prior
military
experience
Arrival=
tenure Killed
Abu Omar
al-Shishani
Chechen=
Georgian=
Russian
parentage
from Pankisi
Umar
Shishani’s
Jama’at
Georgian
Army, 2008
2012
Salahuddin
al-Shishani
Kist Chechen
from Pankisi
(unconfirmed)
Jaish
al-Muhajireen
wal-Ansar
Regional
insurgency,
2010 (exact
details
unknown)
2013
Sayfullakh
al-Shishani
Kist Chechen
from Pankisi
Sayfullakh
Shishani’s
Jama’at
Chechnya
(exact details
unknown)
2012 February
2014
Muslim Abu
Walid
al-Shishani
Kist Chechen
from Pankisi
Junud
as-Sham
Regional
insurgency,
2002
2012
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were killed. What exactly happened remains unclear but at least some of the group
were affiliated to one of the Dagestani jama’ats and the Russian forces had relocated
significant numbers of troops to Dagestan, partly to quell the insurgency, and partly
with a long-term strategy to isolate the local jama’ats ahead of the Sochi Olympic
Games. The incident may have acted as a catalyst, forcing many local affiliates of
the regional insurgency to seek safehaven elsewhere, with some relocating to Turkey
and eventually Syria.
Nevertheless, the ideological frame and the logistical networks enabled
multi-ethnic groups including dozens of volunteers from the North Caucasus to
establish themselves quickly in Northern Syria. At the same time, the different
groups in Syria led by Russian-speaking fighters also reflect much of the factionalism
that has shaped the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus over the past fifteen
years.
Established in 2012, one of the most significant groups is known as Junud
as-Sham. Largely comprised of fighters from the North Caucasus, the group is led
by the Pankisi-born Kist-Chechen Muslim ‘‘Abu Walid’’ al-Shishani. His biographi-
cal material suggests that he is in his thirties, and that he is surrounded by a very
small coterie of veterans from the conflicts in the North Caucasus, as well as a small
group of trusted supporters. Although independent, Junud often fights alongside
other factions, having been involved in a number of battles in the Aleppo governor-
ate, where it is based. Even though he was a young man when the second conflict in
Chechnya began, his background and connections in Pankisi, and his role as an aide
to Chechen and Arab fighters between 2000 and 2003 have given Muslim al-Shishani
some influence among the North Caucasian fighters in Syria. Statements released by
Junud show that their account of jihad is in keeping with that of key leaders from
Chechnya, emphasizing the need to avoid infighting between groups and the impor-
tance of doctrinal support for activism from learned religious scholars.78 However,
the group lacks munitions and financial support.
A second larger group known as Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar formed inMarch
2013 when three separate groups—Katibat al-Muhajireen, Jaish Muhammad, and
Katibat al-Khattab—merged. It incorporated Azeri, Tatar, Dagestani, and Chechen
activists, as well as other Russian speakers from the North Caucasus and across
Russia. The group was led by Abu Omar al-Shishani, another Kisti Chechen from
the Pankisi Gorge. Available biographical material indicates that he was born in
the mid-1980s and served in the Georgian Army during the 2008 conflict with Russia,
albeit not in a combat role. Abu Omar had support from Abu Yahya al-Azeri—the
leader of the Azeri volunteers in Syria—which enabled him to call on some fighters
with active combat experience, as part of Jaish.
In the early months after its inception, Jaish, much like Junud, played a ‘‘social
role’’ in the Aleppo area, dealing with local disputes and distributing food and med-
icines. Jaish and Junud have also both issued appeals for support from benefactors in
Europe, with Junud regularly publishing communique´s in German, English, and
Russian. The group has benefited from an informal support network in Austria
and Germany, shedding light on the role of the recent North Caucasian Diaspora
community. Many North Caucasian emigrants, including younger men, held strong
views about the local administration in Chechnya, while some older men could not
return to their homeland, having been involved in the more recent conflict of the late
1990s.79 These groups in Austria and Germany also maintained informal links to
militant sympathisers from within local Turkish communities.80 Another group of
Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and ‘‘Beyond’’ 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 03
:22
 26
 M
ay
 20
15
 
Russian-speaking volunteers led by Sayfullakh al-Shishani, a third militia leader
with links to the Pankisi Gorge, had more explicit links to Turkey, Sayfullakh having
spent a considerable amount of time in Istanbul. The jama’at was part of Jaish,
although it split in September 2013.81
A portion of the foreign fighters from North Africa who were originally linked
to Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, along with many of the volunteers from Europe,
had become aligned to Abu Omar in Syria. At the same time, other small groups of
fighters from Southern Russia tainted the reputation of the North Caucasian
volunteers based in the Aleppo governorate. Their actions also led to disagreements
with local groups and other foreign fighters. Abu Omar was finding it difficult to
manage the mushrooming foreign fighter movement. In late 2013, he was report-
edly pressured by a few influential Chechen religious advisors and other affiliates
of Baghdadi to swear allegiance to the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). By this stage, the military successes of ISIL had generated
momentum and were growing in power and influence in Syria and Iraq. This put
ISIL in competition with the Al Qaeda (AQ) faction, Jabhat al-Nusra, for influence
in jihadi circles.
In early 2014, the media wing of AQ issued an extended audio-visual com-
munique´ from Ayman al-Zawahiri.82 The communique´ was partly designed to draw
attention to al-Zawahiri, as a legitimate leader. This was especially pertinent given
the bitter doctrinal debates between AQ and the hierarchy of ISIL, and the procla-
mation of Abu Bakr Baghdadi as head of the Islamic Caliphate. Much of the debate
in militant circles focused on fealty, leadership, religious authority, and oaths of
allegiance. However, the timing and part of the content also contained a secondary
message, aimed at groups in Syria. Al-Zawahiri was keen to draw attention to his
own experience in the North Caucasus, boldly embracing the importance of the
Chechen victory against the Russian authorities in the 1990s. The video address used
images of moderate and more militant Chechen leaders, as if to demonstrate
al-Zawahiri’s knowledge and understanding of the Chechen cause, and jihad in
the North Caucasus.
The decision by Abu Omar al-Shishani to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State
leader, Baghdadi, heralded the relative decline of Jabhat al-Nusra in some parts of
Syria. In November 2013, Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar split, when Abu Omar
pledged an oath to Abu Bakr Baghdadi. Hundreds of non-Syrian foreign fighters
aligned themselves with ISIL, while a smaller faction of largely North Caucasian
jihadists remained loyal to Jaish. Many of the North Caucasians had already pledged
allegiance to Doku Umarov, the then leader of the Imarat Kavkaz. Following the
split, Jaish retained the name of the group and announced a new leader, Salahuddin
al-Shishani, who reportedly acted as a representative of the IK in Syria.
Jaish, Junud, and others continued to operate in areas where Jabhat al-Nusra
retained influence. Each faction vied for influence, using social media to promote their
respective accounts of jihad. Sayfullakh al-Shishani and his followers had a measure of
independence before becoming more closely aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra. They
positioned themselves alongside Junud and Jaish, leading to further bitter doctrinal
recriminations between the North Caucasians in Syria. By this time, Abu Yayha—
the leader of one Azeri faction and the former deputy of Abu Omar—had been killed,
leaving a small inner circle of North Caucasians in ISIL. However, Abu Omar became
increasingly prominent as a military leader, commanding support from a much wider
base of foreign fighters operating under the aegis of ISIL.
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Other smaller groups of Chechen or Russian-speaking volunteers continue to
operate across Northern Syria, as part of the broader mosaic of factions and militia
fighting against the Assad regime. The conflict has developed an overtly sectarian
character, with groups and factions participating in joint operations on an ad hoc
basis. One such operation was the assault on the prison complex in Aleppo in
February 2014. The groups led by Salahuddin al-Shishani, Abu Muslim, and
Sayfullakh were all involved in the attack, although it was under the overall com-
mand of the al-Nusra Front. The fact that Chechen groups used a suicide truck
bomb attack carried out by a British citizen, Abdul Waheed Majid, generated media
coverage in the Western news media. However, the assault eventually failed and also
led to the death of Sayfullakh, a significant blow to one of the North Caucasian
factions with links in Turkey, while the deaths of other North Caucasians appear
to have weakened their presence in some foreign fighter units.
The actions of the Russian-speaking foreign fighters highlight how different gen-
erations of volunteers became involved in the plethora of militia in the Syrian civil
war. However, if the actions of these groups are to be properly contextualised, their
connections to the North Caucasus should serve as a point of departure.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the category ‘‘foreign fighter’’ is often used in a general
and ubiquitous way, sometimes clouding the complicated nature of activism. The
article has also sought to contribute to further debate, through the recognition of
the life-cycle of ‘‘foreign fighters’’—that is, mobilisation, activism, and disengage-
ment. As has been argued here, early, loose definitions provide the more useful start-
ing point for further analysis, emphasising how a combination of motives based on
religion, kinship, and ideology informed the decision by some to undertake volun-
teerism and participate in foreign conflicts. In so doing, I have argued that contem-
porary work on ‘‘relatedness’’ and ‘‘fictive kin’’ can supplement research into
transnational activism at the individual and local, organisational (or network),
and ideological levels.
At the same time, I have argued that the label ‘‘foreign fighter’’ can be supple-
mented by a more thorough analysis of transnational activism. By demonstrating
that many volunteers do not frame their activism as ‘‘foreign,’’ but instead partici-
pate in conflicts alongside ‘‘fictive kin,’’ I have argued that participation in exter-
nal conflicts is a multifaceted and dynamic phenomenon. At the same time, the
process of activism engenders the formation of new forms of ‘‘relatedness’’ and
‘‘fictive kin.’’ Similarly, I have argued that many activists may hold dual roles as
volunteers and combatants, situating their actions not solely as combatants or
fighters alone. This highlights how problematic the category of foreign fighter
has become, but also the need to refer to transnational activism, more generally,
when assessing foreign fighters as social networks operating in wider social move-
ments. Evidently this has direct relevance for policies designed to deter partici-
pation in foreign conflicts, and wider relevance for different inter-disciplinary
approaches to transnational activism.
In order to highlight these themes, the article has drawn on a dataset of volun-
teers participating in the conflicts in the North Caucasus from 1992 through to 2013.
This longitudinal, case study approach highlights how ‘‘kinship, ideology and
religion’’ played a role for different groups involved in the conflict. The case study
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illustrates that diaspora connections play an important role, in some forms of
activism and some ‘‘framing’’ narratives. Assessing the life-cycle of foreign fighters
also illustrates the importance of prior military experience, the role of leadership,
and some of the ways in which roles change over time. These threads also ran
through the section of the article which dealt with Russian-speaking volunteers in
Syria. Volunteers fight for a range of reasons, but the combination of an extant
network, an ideological framework, and a mixture of veterans and inexperienced
activists provides a powerful combination which enables the mobilisation of different
communities. In other words, a proclivity to participate in foreign conflicts may stem
from co-existing motives. The inability of some groups to return home, or to reinte-
grate into local communities, also appears to have influenced the decision by some
Russian-speaking volunteers to participate in the civil war in Syria.
The article has also made a contribution to wider discussions about ideological
frames, diffusion, and leadership, drawing on the conflicts in the North Caucasus,
and more recently Syria. The analysis herein illustrates how particular forms of
pan-Islamism have shaped the conflicts in Chechnya during the 1990s, while also
shedding light on the ways in which disputes, splintering, and factionalism occurred
as external groups sought to influence local conflict dynamics. Finally, the scale-shift
evident in the establishment of the Imarat Kavkaz (IK)—a regional movement—
along with the different roles played by Saudi, Jordanian, and Turkish volunteers,
highlights how case study research can enrich accounts of transnational activism.
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